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Adaptive management is the new paradigm in environmental law.
It is omnipresent in scholarship and management documents and is even
starting to appear in court opinions. There have been many calls for
environmental law to adapt itself to adaptive management by becoming
more flexible and dynamic. But does adaptive management really
warrant a revolution in environmental law?
Or is it adaptive
management that might need to adapt to the world of environmental
law?
There has been an abundance of scholarship on the strengths of
adaptive management, making the case for changing environmental law
to embrace adaptive management. But answering the two questions
above also requires a close examination of the limits of adaptive
management and whether it is important enough for environmental law
that wholesale changes in the legal structure are required.1 In this
∗ Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Thanks to Kai Lee, Robin
Kundis Craig, J.B. Ruhl, Holly Doremus, Steve Gold, and participants at the Akron School of Law
Symposium on the Future of Environmental Law for thoughtful comments. This work was
generously supported by a grant from the David and Lucille Packard Foundation.
1. I agree with Holly Doremus that these questions have not been asked enough in the legal,
scientific, or management literature. See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information
Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1460 (2011) [hereinafter Doremus, Adaptive Management as an
Information Problem] (noting that there is “not enough discussion about whether [adaptive
management] ought to be used”).
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Article, I summarize the literature noting those limits, and my
conclusion is that those limits are significant enough that we should be
wary of wholesale revisions of environmental law to allow adaptive
management to occur. Adaptive management has an important role to
play, but there are many questions that it cannot answer. Moreover, the
increased flexibility and dynamism that have been called for in
environmental law would carry their own costs.
I. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS THE NEW PARADIGM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Adaptive management is based on the principle of “learning by
doing” 2 and is frequently presented as a form of experimentation.
Ideally, managers implement different management policies for a
resource at different places at the same time, they monitor any
differences in outcomes over time, and those differences in outcomes
help answer questions about which management policies might be more
or less successful for achieving management goals. For instance, a
forest manager might be uncertain about whether harvesting standing
dead timber after a fire increases or reduces forest regeneration. The
manager might harvest timber at five sites that have had a fire, not
harvest timber at another five sites, and then monitor whether there are
any differences in regeneration at the ten sites. 3
The concept of adaptive management has been expanded beyond
this classic form (which came to be known as “active adaptive
management”). 4 One extension is that managers, instead of consciously
or actively creating differences in management across multiple sites in
order to produce information, might rely on historical data to produce
rigorous models about how environmental systems function, use those
models to identify a single best-practice for management, and implement
that practice. Managers would also use monitoring to observe whether
results diverge from predictions from the model, and use those
divergences to update the model and the management system. This
option gained the moniker of “passive adaptive management” because
managers were not using active experimentation to reduce uncertainty.5
2. C.J. Walters & C.S. Holling, Large-scale Management Experiments and Learning By
Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2061. A key problem of “passive adaptive management” is that it can “confound
management and environmental effects.” Because there is only one management model, it is
impossible to determine whether a change in outcome is the result of a change in management or
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Another option is to simply make initial management choices in a
“haphazard” way without development of a rigorous model to generate
predictions about what results management should produce; instead,
managers would simply monitor results and adjust if results were not
achieving management goals. This is appropriately called “trial and
error,” 6 and many adaptive management scholars consider it, in fact, to
be very different from adaptive management. 7
Adaptive management has become a dominant theme in the
scholarship and practice of environmental law, so dominant that many
scholars and managers assert that the only feasible option for
environmental law is adaptive management. 8 The dynamic nature of
natural systems has provided a major rationale for the widespread
embrace of adaptive management. 9 The looming inevitability of
significant climate change provides another impetus for these calls for
adaptive management, as scholars assert that the only way for
environmental regulation and management to remain functional in the
face of climate change is for those regulatory and management systems
to become adaptive. 10

concurrent changes in environmental conditions (e.g., climate or weather).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Kai Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y NO. 2, ART. 3
(1999); Lance Gunderson & Stephen S. Light, Adaptive Management and Adaptive Governance in
the Everglades Ecosystem, 39 POLICY SCI.’S 323, 326-27 (2006).
8. J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV.
424, 424-25 (2010) (“Adaptive management has become the tonic of natural resources policy.”); id.
at 430 (“[T]here has been broad consensus among resource managers and academics that adaptive
management is the only practical way to implement ecosystem management.”); J.B. Ruhl, Climate
Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363,
422 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 25 n.7 (2005) (“As gloomy as the prospects for adaptive management appear today,
regulation by adaptive management is inevitable.”); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem
Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV.
943, 943 (2003).
9. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 1121, 1139 (1994) (“The major
institutional change necessitated by the nonequilibrium paradigm is the need to apply adaptive
management to biodiversity protection.”); J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHO
L. REV. 385, 394-95, 402-03 (2002); Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a
Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Alejandro Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 39-40 (2009); Joshua J. Lawler,
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies for Resource Management and Conservation Planning, 1162
ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI.’S 79, 85 (2009); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to
Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land
Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 836-37 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, Stationarity is Dead—
Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL.
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Yet the calls for the widespread adoption of adaptive management
have been matched by the observations that adaptive management has
had few real-world successes to date. 11 A common response to this
tension has been to argue that inflexible bureaucracies and laws are a
primary obstacle to successful implementation of adaptive
management, 12 and the legal system must give way and change to allow
for adaptation to proceed.13
L. REV. 9, 17 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 54 (2001)
[herein after Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act] (noting that “skepticism
about adaptive management comes from the lack of success stories to date”); Carl J. Walters, Is
Adaptive Management Helping to Solve Fisheries Problems?, 36 AMBIO 304 (2007) (arguing that
adaptive management has “been radically less successful than one would expect from its intuitive
appeal”).
12. See Brian Walker et al., Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in Socialecological Systems, 9(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 5 (2004) (“Adaptive management, widely and
deservedly promoted as a necessary basis for sustainable development, has frequently failed because
the existing governance structures have not allowed it to function effectively.”); C.S. Holling, What
Barriers? What Bridges?, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND
INSTITUTIONS 3, 9 (Lance H. Gunderson et al., eds. 1995) (arguing that agencies tend to focus on
one target and short-term outputs and fail to test hypotheses or experiment and that the solution is
“flexible, adaptive policies, not rigid, locked-in ones”); Ahjond S. Garemstani et al., Panarchy,
Adaptive Management, and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV.
1036, 1036 (2009) (arguing that solving environmental problems “requires frequent recalibration of
the policy used to address the environmental issue”); Craig R. Allen et al., Adaptive Management
For A Turbulent Future, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1339, 1343 (2011) (“Legal certainty does not mesh
well with environmental unpredictability. . . . The certainty of law and institutional rigidity often
limit the experimentation that is necessary for adaptive management,” and the “adversarial character
of administrative law, combined with the need for certainty (e.g., procedural rules) in the larger
realm of American law, is likely incompatible with adaptive management”). Surveys of federal
environmental agency employees have revealed similar sentiments. Tomas M. Koontz & Jennifer
Bodine, Implementing Ecosystem Management in Public Agencies: Lessons from the U.S. Bureau of
Land Management and the Forest Service, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 60, 65 (2008) (BLM
employees report lawsuits and appeals as most important legal barrier to adaptive management);
George H. Stankey et al., Adaptive Management and the Northwest Forest Plan: Rhetoric and
Reality, 101 J. OF FORESTRY 40 (Jan/Feb. 2003) (interview with primarily Forest Service employees
finds that they believe that law is a significant constraint on adaptive management and that
endangered species protection reduces risk taking); FORREST FLEISCHMAN, BUREAUCRACY,
COLLABORATION, AND COPRODUCTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADAPTIVE
USDA
FOREST
SERVICE
12
(2008),
available
at
MANAGEMENT
IN
THE
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/publications/materials/conference_papers/fleischman.pdf
(noting survey that found that FS employees complained of constraints by legal system and riskaversion within the agency that restricted adaptive management).
13. Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67 (“Legislatures and policymakers should thus
incorporate comprehensive and pervasive adaptive management requirements and procedures into
natural resource management statutes.”); Sandra Zellmer & Lance Gunderson, Why Resilience May
Not Always Be a Good Thing: Lessons in Ecosystem Restoration from Glen Canyon and the
Everglades, 87 NEB. L. REV. 893, 949 (2009) (“Legal vehicles should enhance flexibility, learning,
and adaptive approaches, rather than reinforce pathologically resilient institutions and
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In terms of the current legal structure, scholars and managers have
articulated two major ways that law might deter adaptive management.
First, the legal system imposes significant costs on active management
efforts through front-end analytic and public participation requirements
under statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”); 14 the costs of doing
environmental review analysis and allowing for public participation, and
the associated costs and risks of judicial review, deter agencies from
making decisions. 15 This undermines adaptive management, which
ecosystems.”); Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12, at 1343 (“[E]nvironmental law must be
‘adapted’ to fit with adaptive management.”). But see Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management,
supra note 8, at 54-56 (arguing that implementation of adaptive management requires restrictions on
volatility and drift in agency decision-making).
A related claim is that adaptive management requires agencies to embrace “organizational
instability.” K. Jeffrey Danter et al., Organizational Change as a Component of Ecosystem
Management, 13 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 537, 538 (2000); Steven L. Yaffee, Ecosystem Management in
Practice: The Importance of Human Institutions, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 724, 726 (1996);
Stephen S. Light et al., The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a Turbulent Ecosystem, in
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 103, 158 (Lance
H. Gunderson et al., eds. 1995); George H. Stankey et al., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS
50-51 (2005). The two concepts (legal flexibility and organizational instability) are often connected
in the adaptive management literature, but they can be distinguished. One could imagine a creative,
dynamic agency that nonetheless operates within a legal framework that is fairly stringent. In this
paper, I only focus on the questions related to legal flexibility.
14. Mark J. Wieringa & Anthony G. Morton, Hydropower, Adaptive Management, and
Biodiversity, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 831, 839 (1996); Thrower, supra note 9, at 886-87; Ruhl,
Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 36; Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12;
Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas Development: Existing
Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 E.L.R. 10962, 10972-73 (2009).
15. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back
Again, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 74-75 (2005) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Panarchy] (“[T]he
adversarial and litigious character of contemporary administrative law coupled with its overall
tendency toward nitpicking enforcement of fixed “command-and-control” rules—especially
procedural rules, which are singularly easy for courts to enforce—and its reluctance to countenance
uncertainty and lack of information as the basis for agency decision-making are all profoundly at
odds with the very concept of adaptive management.”); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66; Mary
Jane Angelo, Stumbling Toward Success: A Story of Adaptive Law and Ecological Resilience, 87
NEB. L. REV. 950, 1001-02 (2009) (“Another challenge of adaptive management is that it may be
difficult to incorporate substantial public participation. . . . If we need to wait to convene all
stakeholders and achieve consensus or near consensus before every action, we simply will not be
able to have the quick reaction time necessary for adaptive management.”); Ruhl, Regulation by
Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 31 (“Quite simply, there is good reason to doubt whether
regulation by adaptive management is possible without substantial change in administrative law.”).
Some of these scholars also note, however, that despite the obstacles that NEPA and the APA might
impose on adaptive management, agencies can nonetheless successfully pursue adaptive
management in the right circumstances. See Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 8, at 441 (“[T]he
impression in agencies that lawsuits and appeals present a barrier to implementing adaptive
management is unfounded.”); id. at 475 (“Despite fundamentally different assumptions about
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requires the repeated reconsideration and reevaluation of decisions over
time in response to new information and, in the context of active
adaptive management, the ability to make more complicated decisions
when setting up an experimental system in the first place.
Second, substantive restrictions on the kinds of managerial actions
that management and regulatory agencies can take might foreclose a
range of important adaptive management options from implementation.
For example, the Endangered Species Act’s (“ESA”) prohibition on
agency action that will jeopardize the existence of listed species might
prevent adaptive management experiments that carry risks for listed
species, but that might also produce significant improvements in
knowledge about how to protect those listed species or other natural
resources. 16
Particular ideas to respond to these problems include: placing
adaptive management authority or mandates directly into environmental
statutes or regulations; 17 reducing or changing judicial review of agency
decisions (whether in general, or in the specific context of adaptive
management); 18 eliminating the finality of at least some kinds of agency
decisions and requiring regular or even constant reevaluation of those
decisions; 19 reducing or altering NEPA requirements for agency
knowledge and decision-making, adaptive management is compatible with NEPA.”)
16. Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 13, at 946-47; Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 29;
Angelo, supra note 15, at 1001; JAMES PIPKIN, THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN REVISITED 49-50
(1998) (arguing that adaptive management in the Northwest Forest Plan was stifled by ESA
constraints); Lance Gunderson, Resilience, Flexibility and Adaptive Management—Antidotes for
Spurious Certitude?, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y NO. 1, ART. 7 (1999) (arguing that adaptive management
in Everglades was obstructed by concerns about whether experiments might harm a listed species);
Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A Legal and
Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473, 496-501 (1996) (arguing that Clean Water
Act and ESA restrictions threatened experimental methods of managing water to restore the
Everglades).
17. J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Management for Natural Resources—Inevitable, Impossible or
Both?, 54 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. FOUND. PROCEEDINGS 11, 11-33 (2008) (“Ideally,
however, Congress and state legislatures will fund and empower agencies to implement adaptive
management.”); Thrower, supra note 9, at 894-95 (calling for incorporation of adaptive
management principles into NEPA through regulations); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67.
18. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, supra note 9, at 406-407 (calling for greater
discretion and more deferential and reduced judicial review for agencies involved in adaptive
management); Karkkainen, Panarchy, supra note 15, at 75 (proposing a “two-track” system in
which adaptive management projects would receive different treatment under administrative law);
Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66-67.
19. Tarlock, supra note 9, at 1140-44; Thrower, supra note 9, at 885-87; Ruhl & Fischman,
supra note 8, at, 437-38 (critique of one-shot, predictive, “front-end” model of administrative law as
inconsistent with iterative, repeated model of adaptive management and realities of natural
resources management, especially climate change); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KANSAS L. REV. 1249, 1251-52
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decisionmaking; 20 reducing or altering public participation requirements
for agency decision-making; 21 reducing or altering other procedural
requirements for agency activities such as plan development or
management decision-making; 22 and altering substantive restrictions that
statutes such as the ESA might place on adaptive management. 23
These are not just ideas being batted around by scholars.
Management and regulatory agencies have adopted the rhetoric of
adaptive management. The U.S. Forest Service repeatedly relied upon
the concept of adaptive management to justify proposed revisions of its
planning regulations that would eliminate mandates to maintain
minimum viable populations of certain wildlife species and would
reduce judicial review, environmental analysis, and public participation
for the development of plans for National Forest lands. 24
II. THE LIMITS OF ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT
Should we be altering the structure and substance of environmental
law to advance the concept of adaptive management? Is adaptive
management in fact so important that environmental law should be
(2004); Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 66-67.
20. Melinda Harm Benson & Ahjond S. Garmestani, Embracing Panarchy, Building
Resilience, and Integrating Adaptive Management Through a Rebirth of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 92 J. OF ENVTL. MGMT. 1420 (2011).
21. Ruhl, A Manifesto for the Radical Middle, supra note 9, at 405-06 (“Adaptive
management cannot work if citizens can challenge every recalibration decision with this full range
of public participation tools. There must be some insulation of the adaptive management process
from the debilitating participation of every interest group demanding a “seat at the table” and right
to challenge each and every move the agency makes.”); Angelo, supra note 15, at 1002-03;
Karkkainen, Panarchy, supra note 15, at 74-75.
22. Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 65-67 (“For example, public lands managers may need
some form of general planning requirements coupled with abbreviated administrative procedures for
specific implementation decisions, periodic rather than continual judicial review for rationality, the
ability to rely on postdecisional evaluations rather than predecisional justifications, or increased
emergency authorities in order to achieve true capacity for adaptive management in the face of
climate change impacts to resources and ecosystems.”); cf. Glicksman, supra note 10, at 836-37
(arguing that cumbersome planning process gets in the way of adaptation to climate change
pressures);
23. Angelo, supra note 15, at 1002 (arguing for lower ESA standards when “the primary
purpose of the proposed action is to maintain or restore ecological resilience to an ecosystem”);
ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLING SENSE OF
IMMENSITY 168, 269 (2007) (call for exemptions from environmental laws (like ESA) to allow for
more experiments); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UPSTREAM: SALMON AND SOCIETY IN THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST 342-43 (1996).
24. See 73 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008); 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005); see also
Martin Nie, Whatever Happened to Ecosystem Management and Federal Lands Planning, in THE
LAWS OF NATURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT LAW AND
POLICY (Kalyani Robbins, ed. 2013).
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overhauled in response?
There are reasons to question whether adaptive management will be
so central to the future of environmental law. There are limits to the
ability of adaptive management to reduce uncertainty (the primary
argument for adaptive management), costs to the use of adaptive
management, and limits to the ability of adaptive management to
improve management and regulatory outcomes.
A.

Limits to the Ability of Adaptive Management to Reduce
Uncertainty
1. Problems of Scale

Active adaptive management implies the use of at least one control
and one treatment option for management, and ideally many more for
statistical analysis purposes. But for environmental problems that are
large-scale getting even two replicates may be extremely costly, or even
impossible. 25 At the extreme, we cannot develop two replicate Earths to
conduct an adaptive management experiment for possible efforts to use
geoengineering to offset the impacts of greenhouse gases. 26 For a
system like the Florida Everglades, which has been the focus of
ecological restoration efforts for decades, replication also may not be
feasible.
The Everglades function as one large, interconnected
ecological system; one purpose of the Everglades restoration program is
to reconnect the hydrology of the system as a whole so that it functions
better. It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to envision how we
might undertake replicates of the major management choices we need to
pursue for the entire Everglades system.
Of course, not all adaptive management need be active. Passive
adaptive management might be feasible at large scales because it does
not require replication. However, note that, as a result, we may reduce
25. R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications to
Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2423 (2006) (active adaptive
management not useful for “large-scale and long-term” problems because can’t develop
experimental system at that level).
26. Geoengineering involves the active human manipulation of the global climate or
atmosphere to offset the effects of greenhouse gases on the climate, either through the reduction of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, or through reduction of the gasses’ effects on
global temperatures. One of the most commonly suggested options is the injection of sulfur
aerosols into the upper atmosphere; the aerosols would increase the reflection of solar radiation and
therefore reduce the heating of the Earth from the sun. In principle, this could offset the increased
insulation caused by greenhouse gases. However, there are tremendous uncertainties about possible
side effects from such efforts.
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the ability to learn from our management and regulatory choices—
precisely the point of adaptive management in the first place.
Likewise, we might develop ways to conduct adaptive management
at subsets of larger units. 27 This concept, to some extent, is how the
adaptive management program in the Everglades has tried to address the
problem of doing replication for large-scale management of an overall
system. Managers have developed smaller-scale pilot projects that
identify key uncertainties in how the larger system operates and attempt
to reduce that uncertainty through experimentation.28 For instance, there
is uncertainty about how successful different methods to backfill
drainage canals and restore natural water flow to the northern Everglades
might be and what risks each method might entail. The agency has
implemented a pilot project of different backfilling efforts for a limited
number of canals to reduce that uncertainty. 29 This can help reduce
uncertainty, but it is limited by the need to extrapolate from the smallerscale experiments to the larger-scale system that is of management
interest.
2. Problems of Time
Adaptive management necessarily requires time: time for the
adaptive management program to be designed; time for replicates to be
established; and time for management to occur, monitoring to be
conducted, results to be collected, and data to be analyzed. 30 However,
some environmental problems are pressing enough that we might not be
able to wait for the production of information from the adaptive
management process to reduce uncertainty. A final decision must be
made now. 31
27. Gregory et al., supra note 25; Murdoch K. McAllister & Randall M. Peterman,
Experimental Design in the Management of Fisheries: A Review, 12 N. AM. J. OF FISH. MGMT. 1
(1992); Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1487-88.
28. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE
EVERGLADES: THE FIRST BIENNIAL REVIEW–2006, 6-12 (providing overview of these efforts and
call for increasing their use).
29. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROGRESS TOWARD RESTORING THE EVERGLADES: THE
FOURTH BIENNIAL REVIEW 70-71 (2012).
30. See W.H. Moir & W.M. Block, Adaptive Management on Public Lands in the United
States: Commitment or Rhetoric?, 28 ENVTL. MGMT. 141, 144 (2001); Byron K. Williams et al.,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
TECHNICAL GUIDE 10 (2009 ed.) [hereinafter Williams et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
TECHNICAL GUIDE].
31. See, e.g., Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at
1471 (noting that a key question is whether learning will happen quickly enough under adaptive
management to make a difference for management).
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This is certainly not a fatal problem for many adaptive management
efforts. 32 One advantage of adaptive management is that it allows for
information production to be produced concurrently with management
choices, since it is management that produces the relevant information.
But when a diversity of management choices cannot be taken, when
decisions are irreversible, and when they must be made now, then
neither active nor passive adaptive management is feasible. A
paradigmatic example of this is the decision about whether to take a
small population of an endangered species into captivity for breeding (as
with the California condor in the 1980s). 33 The population is small
enough that replication is not feasible (foreclosing active adaptive
management), the decision about which approach to use may well be
irreversible (foreclosing passive adaptive management), and delay might
simply allow the species to vanish into extinction.
3. Problems of Information Production
Active and passive adaptive management both require high-quality
monitoring to be successful. However, there are several reasons to
question whether regulatory and management agencies will, in fact,
undertake the high-quality monitoring needed to reduce uncertainty.
High-quality monitoring requires extended periods of time and
often must be continuous in that time frame, it must be well-matched in
time and space to the scale of the questions it seeks to answer, and it is
usually extremely costly. 34 It is often difficult for outsiders, particularly
non-experts, to assess the quality of monitoring. 35
The need for continuity, and the opacity of monitoring to outside
supervision, make monitoring particularly susceptible to asymmetric
32. Political pressures to make management decisions happen sooner rather than later might
likewise prevent effective use of adaptive management. As BLM developed oil and gas in
Wyoming’s Powder River Basin, the agency claimed that it did not have the authority to slow down
development to allow for the results of monitoring to be collected, analyzed, and used to adapt
management decisions; accordingly, an adaptive management option was rejected by the agency.
See Melinda Harm Benson, Adaptive Management Approaches by Resource Management Agencies
in the United States: Implications for Energy Development in the Interior West, 28 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 87, 107 (2010); Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and Gas
Development, supra note 14, at 10974-75 (noting that political pressure on BLM to quickly approve
oil and gas leases in Pinedale, Wyoming region lead to massive expansion of drilling before any
monitoring data could be brought to bear on the decision-making process).
33. For an overview of the relevant facts, see National Audubon Society v. Hester, 801 F.2d
405 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
34. Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22-34
(2011).
35. Id. at 27-34.
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pressures in the political process. 36 Myopia makes it difficult for
agencies and legislatures to commit to long-term monitoring
programs. 37 Courts often defer to the information produced by
agencies, further weakening incentives to produce high-quality
information. 38 Agencies with multiple objectives might be wary of
pursuing monitoring when the resulting data might result in conflicts
with other objectives. 39 Even when a direct conflict does not exist,
actual monitoring data might constrain an agency’s freedom of
maneuver and autonomy in the future in unpredictable ways. 40 Finally,
agency institutional culture might not be amenable to pursuing
monitoring. For instance, scientists in agencies might have few
professional incentives to conduct long-term monitoring projects. 41
4. Problems of Institutional Continuity
Institutional continuity is not just important for the collection of
data, but also for the overall maintenance of adaptive management
programs. Often the results of different experiments may take many
years to bear the fruit of reduced uncertainty, in part because of the long
time frames at which many ecological processes operate, or alternatively
the long time frames required to detect the signal of meaningful
information in the noise of ecological variation. Thus, tremendous
patience may be needed by agencies, legislators, interest groups, and the
public to determine whether different management options will produce
different results. Many adaptive management advocates frame adaptive
management as a long-term investment in improved information, often
at the short-term cost of foregone resource exploitation or increased risk
to environmental benefits.42
36. Id. at 35-39. I discuss these asymmetries infra Part II.B.2.
37. Id. at 39-40.
38. Id. at 41-43.
39. Id. at 43-48.
40. Id. at 48-51.
41. Id. at 51-53.
42. See, e.g., Tracy M. Rout et al., Optimal Adaptive Management For The Translocation of
a Threatened Species, 19 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 515, 520 (2009); Carl Walters, Challenges in
adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems, 1 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y ART. 1 (1997);
Andrew N. Gray, Adaptive Ecosystem Management in the Pacific Northwest: A Case Study from
ECOLOGY
(Nov.
23,
2000),
available
at
Coastal
Oregon,
CONSERVATION
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol4/iss2/art6/; Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Dancing:
Interactions Between Social Resilience and Ecological Crises, in NAVIGATING SOCIALECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: BUILDING RESILIENCE FOR COMPLEXITY AND CHANGE 33, 44 (Fikret Berkes
& Johan Colding, eds. 2003) (“Learning is a long-term proposition, which requires a ballast against
short-term politics and objectives.”); see also Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information
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However, if myopia is a significant factor in environmental
decision-making, this patience might be hard to come by. Building
strong institutions that are resilient to political pressures would seem to
be a plausible response, but many adaptive management advocates also
call for organizational instability as necessary for adaptive management
to succeed. 43
5. Problems of Learning
If the dynamism of an environmental resource is high enough, there
are questions about whether learning and therefore the reduction of
uncertainty is even feasible. In a number of areas, environmental
conditions change quickly enough, and are unpredictable enough, that
data are useless for management or regulatory purposes soon after they
are collected. For instance, water quality in beaches can change in a
matter of minutes, far more quickly than the twenty-four to forty-eighthour timeframes required for current monitoring techniques, and water
quality can change for reasons that are still only partially understood.44
The population dynamics of certain fish species (such as sardines,
anchovies, and perhaps cod) are highly variable and still poorly

Problem, supra note 1, at 1461 (Adaptive management “requires striking a balance between shortterm management objectives and long-term learning, between devoting resources to management
and to monitoring.”).
43. See supra note 13 at accompanying text.
44. See Molly K. Leecaster & Stephen B. Weisberg, Effect of Sampling Frequency on
Shoreline Microbiology Assessments, 42 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 1150 (2001); Kellogg J.
Schwab, Are Existing Bacterial Indicators Adequate for Determining Recreational Water Illness in
Waters Impacted by Nonpoint Pollution?, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGY 21 (2007); Timothy J. Wade et al.,
Rapidly Measured Indicators of Recreational Water Quality Are Predictive of SwimmingAssociated Gastrointestinal Illness, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 24 (2006); Linwood
Pendleton, The Economics of Using Ocean Observing Systems to Improve Beach Closure Policy, 36
COASTAL MGMT. 165, 167-68 (2008); A.B. Boehm et al., Decadal and Shorter Period Variability of
Surf Zone Water Quality at Huntington Beach, California, 36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3885 (2002)
(“The concentration of fecal indicator bacteria in the surf zone at Huntington Beach, CA, varies
over time scales that span at least 7 orders of magnitude, from minutes to decades. . . . These results
demonstrate that coastal water quality is forced by a complex combination of local and external
processes and raise questions about the efficacy of existing marine bathing water monitoring and
reporting programs.”); Joon Ha Kim & Stanley B. Grant, Public Mis-Notification of Coastal Water
Quality: A Probabilistic Evaluation of Posting Errors at Huntington Beach, California, 38 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 2497, 2501 (2004) (time delays in analysis, high variability of contamination, and
infrequent sampling mean that posting water-contamination notices are prone to large amounts of
error (both under- and overprotective) with up to forty-percent error rate) (“An analysis of . . . data
at Huntington Beach reveals that posting decisions would have to be updated every forty minutes
(or more frequently) to significantly reduce posting errors.”); Alexandria D. Boehm & Stephen B.
Weisberg, Tidal Forcing of Enterococci at Marine Recreational Beaches at Fortnightly and
Semidiurnal Frequencies, 39 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5575, 5578 (2005).
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understood, such that it might not be possible to predict whether a
population is about to collapse ahead of time. 45 Dynamism and
complexity can be manageable and be the basis for useful learning if
they fall within certain limits, but not if dynamism and complexity result
in unpredictable changes that produce either new, unprecedented states
for natural systems, or otherwise result in uncertain limits to the status of
important environmental resources.
The challenge is that if past performance is no indication at all of
the future, then there is little possibility that the results of past adaptive
management will be of use for future management choices. Advocates
of adaptive management have pointed to the dynamism and complexity
of natural systems as a reason to embrace the concept, but if dynamism
and complexity are high and unpredictable enough, it is hard to see how
any form of experimentation or monitoring could reduce uncertainty to a
degree sufficient to help guide decisions.
B.

The Costs of Adaptive Management
1. Direct Costs of Adaptive Management

Adaptive management is costly in terms of resources and foregone
opportunities. 46 Active and passive adaptive management both impose
45. See W.G. Clark, THE LESSONS OF THE PERUVIAN ANCHOVETA FISHERY, 19 CALIFORNIA
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 57, 60-61 (1975-76); Daniel LluchBelda et al., The Recovery of the California Sardine as Related to Global Change, 33 CALIFORNIA
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 50, 50, 58 (1992); Kevin Hill & Tim
Baumgartner, Pacific Sardine: Past, Present, and Future, Symposium Introduction, 46 CALIFORNIA
COOPERATIVE OCEANIC FISHERIES INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS 73, 73 (2005); Arthur F. McEvoy &
Harry N. Scheiber, Scientists, Entrepreneurs, and the Policy Process: A Study of the post-1945
California Sardine Depletion, 44 J. ECON. HISTORY 393, 398 (1984); R.J.H. Beverton, Small
Marine Pelagic Fish and the Threat of Fishing; Are They Endangered, 37 J. FISH BIOLOGY (Supp.
A.) 5 (1990).
46. See, e.g., Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2411 (arguing that biological scientists are
“attracted to AM because it provides a tenable mechanism for applying the scientific method to
challenging problems facing complex ecosystems, often resulting in the design of costly
experiments that tend to ignore impacts on other important environmental, social, or economic
objectives”); Craig R. Allen & Lance H. Gunderson, Pathology and Failure in the Design and
Implementation of Adaptive Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1379, 1381 (2011); see also
Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Value of Information in Fishery Management, 33 FISHERIES 340 (2008)
(noting tradeoff between obtaining new information and getting additional production from the
resource); HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 9 (2011) [hereinafter HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM]; Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1,
at 1459; Marcia Barinaga, A recipe for river recovery?, 273 SCI. 1648, 1650 (1996); KAI LEE,
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE 53, 66 (1992); Carl J. Walters & Roger Green, Valuation of
Experimental Management Options for Ecological Systems, 61 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 987, 993
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costs for monitoring and analyzing the results of management decisions;
active adaptive management imposes the additional costs of establishing
multiple management strategies (which often may be more costly than
simply managing pursuant to a single prescription). All of these costs
may be significant. 47
There are also additional costs. In active adaptive management, by
definition, we are choosing to use a diverse strategy of management
techniques. Some of those techniques will likely or certainly be less
effective at achieving particular goals than others, so the choice of a
diverse strategy will result in less output of those goals, at least in the
near term. 48 For instance, the decision to close some areas of a fishing
ground in order to determine whether closures will improve the status of
a fish stock will necessarily result in less catch of fish in the near term. 49
Of course, the cost of adaptive management does not mean that it
should not be pursued. The key question is whether the cost is
outweighed by the benefit of new information or reduced uncertainty
that adaptive management can provide.50 An example of how a costbenefit analysis might weigh against adaptive management comes from
efforts to control the sea lamprey, an invasive aquatic species that
significantly harms fisheries in the Great Lakes. There are existing,
proven mechanisms to control the lamprey, but also additional possible
tools that might be more effective. Researchers concluded, however,
that the additional knowledge from an adaptive management program
was outweighed by the benefits of pursuing existing control methods for
the lampreys. Thus, the funds that would be needed to be spent on
testing new methods and monitoring the results would be better spent on
current management choices. 51
(1997).
47. HOLLY DOREMUS, ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 5
(adaptive management “requires more resources than conventional management, because doing it
right requires taking the time to carefully analyze the system at the outset, monitor the results, and
periodically reassess and revise”).
48. Cindy L. Halbert, How Adaptive is Adaptive Management? Implementing Adaptive
Management in Washington State and British Columbia, 1 REVIEWS IN FISHERY SCI. NO. 3, 261,
274 (1993); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 913, 942-43 (2005) (noting tradeoff between “exploration” (i.e., learning) and
“exploitation” (i.e., production or achieving the underlying goals) is inherent in flexibility, and a
mixed strategy that is only partly flexible and adaptive may be superior).
49. Donald Ludwig et al., Uncertainty, Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons
from History, 260 SCI. 17, 17-18 (1993).
50. Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1479.
51. Eli P. Fenichel & Gretchen J.A. Hansen, The Opportunity Cost of Information: An
Economic Framework For Understanding the Balance Between Assessment and Control in Sea
Lamprey (Petromyzon marinus) Management, 67 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 209, 210
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Cost will not simply be economic. Experimentation in management
of endangered species can provide important information and reduced
uncertainty, but it can also create risks of harm to the species, even the
possibility of extinction. Consider a proposal to allow logging in
selected riparian zones (normally protected from logging) that are
breeding habitat for an endangered salmon run to test the hypothesis that
logging does not affect the species, or might even help it. There is a risk
that the change to the status quo will harm the species significantly, but
that risk may result in the production of useful information or reduced
uncertainty. 52 Again, the question is whether the short-term risk of
increased environmental harm is worth the benefits of long-term
information production, particularly where the risk is of irreversible
harm. 53
This tradeoff is particularly challenging because the most
information might be produced by management options that are the most
extreme, and, therefore, the most costly or the most risky. 54 Small
manipulations or changes in management strategies are less likely to
produce significant changes in outcomes that can be detected using
statistical techniques.
All of these costs will mean that adaptive management will not
always (or perhaps often) be a useful management strategy for a wide
range of environmental problems. Where reduction in uncertainty is not
a high priority for managers and regulators—perhaps because
uncertainty does not matter a lot to decisionmakers, 55 or because there
isn’t a lot of uncertainty to begin with 56—then the costs of adaptive

(2010).
52. PIPKIN, supra note 16, at 49-50 (1998) (describing this conflict in the context of
managing riparian areas of forest in the Pacific Northwest).
53. Where the environmental risks from adaptive management involve irreversible harms to
resources that society values highly, risks might greatly outweigh any possible benefits from
adaptive management. See Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2419 (noting possibility of “taboo
tradeoffs” that will effectively prevent adaptive management).
54. See Donald Ludwig & Carl J. Walters, Fitting Population Viability Analysis into
Adaptive Management, in POPULATION VIABILITY ANALYSIS 511, 515 (Steven R. Beissinger &
Dale R. McCullough eds., 2002).
55. See Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2419 (differences that adaptive management is
intended to identify must be large enough to matter for decisionmakers); Williams et al., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 30, at 11 (Adaptive management
should only be done when the “value of information for decisionmaking is high.”).
56. Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1467-68
(adaptive management is “only useful if learning is needed” because “information gaps” limit
management); Rout et al., supra note 42, at 520; Michael A. McCarthy & Hugh P. Possingham,
Active Adaptive Management for Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 957, 957 (2007).
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management will rarely be worth it. 57
2. The Costs of Flexibility
Adaptive management, whether active or passive, necessarily
requires flexibility in future management or regulatory choices. That
flexibility creates uncertainty for human actors—such as developers who
might wish to know exactly what kinds of mitigation burdens they will
have to accept as they determine whether a project is economically
feasible or not. That uncertainty creates significant costs—economic,
social, psychological—for the human communities in which adaptive
management is occurring. 58
There are additional costs from flexibility—the costs that flexibility
might pose to environmental law in general. Holly Doremus and others
have pointed out that the flexibility and discretion adaptive management
requires may be abused by management and regulatory agencies.
Indeed, agencies might use the cover of adaptive management, without
the substance, to pursue other agendas. 59
There is ample literature in environmental legal scholarship that
points out the asymmetries in implementation of environmental
regulatory and management standards: In general, because the benefits
of environmental law are dispersed and the costs concentrated, regulated
parties will have stronger incentives and abilities to organize, monitor,

57. See Michael J. Conroy et al., Application of Decision Theory To Conservation
Management: Recovery of Hector’s Dolphin, 35 WILDLIFE RESEARCH 93, 99-100 (2008) (should
only pay for additional information up to “expected value of perfect information” in order to do
more research that is worthwhile (and usually less, given statistical noise).
Many advocates for adaptive management argue that society systematically underestimates the
benefits of learning from adaptive management and overestimates the costs of adaptive
management. See, e.g., John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly:
Columbia River Salmon, the Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L.
1239, 1256-57 (1993); Walters & Holling, supra note 2, at 2062; Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 7
(“the costs of lost learning are seldom accounted for when experimentation is restricted or
prohibited”).
58. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1406-07, 1413-14
(2011).
59. See Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 569 (2007) [hereinafter Doremus, Precaution, Science, and
Learning]; Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, supra note 11, at 53;
Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change with Law that Bends without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45, 80 (2010) [hereinafter Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change]; Daniel
J. Rohlf, Integrating Science, Law, and Policy in Managing Natural Resources: Towards a Sound
Mix Rather than a Sound Bite, in FOREST FUTURES 127, 129 (Karen Arabas & Joe Bowersox, eds.,
2004).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/5

16

Biber: Adaptive Management
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 4 BIBER (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

9/19/2013 2:31 PM

949

and influence the passage and implementation of environmental laws.60
As Dan Farber and others have noted, the result of these public choice
dynamics can be significant slippage in the implementation of
environmental laws compared to the standards on the books, and outside
enforcement of relatively stringent, inflexible standards can be an
important tool to constrain that slippage. 61
Relatively inflexible standards can also be important precommitment devices.
Richard Lazarus has described how precommitment devices can help address harms that are distributed over
time and space, as many environment problems are. 62 Given the longterm nature of many environmental harms, such as climate change, precommitment may be important to constrain myopic decision-making by
implementing agencies or myopic pressure by interest groups.63 Precommitment may be especially important when decision-makers and the
public might become used to deteriorated environmental conditions and
therefore sequentially and repeatedly accept more and more
environmental harm over time (what has been called the “shifting
baselines” problem); 64 inflexible standards can constrain this kind of
subtle degradation in standards. 65
Flexibility, to the extent that it requires reductions in procedural
requirements for environmental decision-making, can also impose costs
in terms of reduced public participation. Flexibility might directly
reduce participation by allowing for fewer opportunities for public
participation. But even if the proposed changes maintain the same
opportunities for public participation, and instead only reduce (for
instance) judicial review of agency compliance with those procedural
requirements, or judicial review of whether agencies have fully

60. See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81, 126–31 (2002); Eric Biber, The
Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 40–49 (2008);
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in
Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 307–08 (1999).
61. See Farber, supra note 60, at 298-99; Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and
Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1156
(2009).
62. Lazarus, supra note 61, at 1197; Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How
Scientific Disciplines Can Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 514-21 (2012);
Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 59, at 48-59.
63. Lazarus, supra note 61, at 1174; Biber, Which Science?, supra note 62, at 516.
64. Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1330 (2009).
65. Of course, this argument presumes the normative undesireability of allowing such shifts
to occur over time. For an argument that shifting baselines might be an appropriate response in
certain circumstances to climate change, see Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at 35, 64.
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considered comments submitted by the public, there may still be
negative impacts on public participation. Members of the public may be
less willing to undertake costly efforts to participate in the decisionmaking process if they believe that their contributions are more likely to
be ignored by the agency. Judicial review can be seen as a credible
commitment by the government to ensure that the agency will take
public participation seriously, and therefore encourage greater
investments by the public in participation. Reduced public participation
will have costs for environmental law and policy. One risk is that
reduced public participation may reduce buy-in by various interest
groups in the ultimate decision, making implementation more difficult.
It may also reduce the quality of the information available to the agency
for decision-making. 66
There is one final potential cost to flexibility. Flexibility can be
seen as delaying decision-making over time, and indeed, this is precisely
how adaptive management is supposed to work, as decision-making is
spread out over time so that additional, useful information can be drawn
upon. But decision-making requires resources: the attention, time, and
consideration of decision-makers (whether administrative, legislative, or
judicial). There is no guarantee that when we delay decisions to the
future that we will have the resources to adequately make decisions then,
as opposed to now. 67
Moreover, if we increase the number of decisions to be made—
which the flexibility of adaptive management specifically requires—we
increase the demands on our decisional resources, perhaps beyond their
limits. We might have particular concerns about increasing the number
of decisions when decisions involve value conflicts and high uncertainty,
and therefore the decisions might be particularly costly. 68 Those two
characteristics are, of course, very true of environmental law. 69

66. For instance, citizen participation appears to improve the decision-making process by
which species are identified as threatened or endangered and listed for protection under the
Endangered Species Act. See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen
Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV.
321 (2010); Berry Brosi & Eric Biber, Citizen Involvement in the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 337
SCI. 802 (2012).
67. Super, supra note 58, at 1406-07, 1435-36.
68. Id.
69. Increasing the number of decisions, and spreading them out over time, might also
exacerbate the possibility of slippage, as representatives of diffuse interests may have greater
difficulty monitoring and influencing decisions that are spread out over time. See Super, supra note
58, at 1423.
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3. Limits to the Ability of Adaptive Management to Improve
Management, or Problems of Uncertainty
As noted above, monitoring is essential to evaluating the results of
adaptive management and to provide the impetus for adaptation in
response to experiments or even trial and error. There will almost
inevitably be uncertainty around monitoring data, because of the
dynamism of so many environmental resources 70 and the limitations that
the large spatial and temporal scales for many ecological questions pose
for data collection. 71 Indeed, because there can be multiple methods for
analyzing monitoring data, and there is no consensus on which methods
are superior in many situations, 72 even disputes over how best to analyze
monitoring data may not be resolvable. Monitoring and adaptive
management might not be able to resolve disputes over the state of a
resource or which management or regulatory options are performing
best. 73
Powerful political actors that are opposed to major management
changes can rely on this nearly inevitable, residual uncertainty to argue
that the results of an adaptive management program do not, in fact,
A helpful example of this
require changes in management. 74
phenomenon is the history of the adaptive management program for the
Glen Canyon Dam. The dam itself has significant impacts on
downstream natural resources in Grand Canyon National Park.
70. Moir & Block, supra note 30, at 144 (“Research seldom has clear answers to contested
management issues.”); LEE, supra note 46, at 46-48, 57-58; Byron K. Williams & Fred A. Johnson,
Adaptive Management and the Regulation of Waterfowl Harvests, 23 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULLETIN
430, 434 (1995); Conroy et al., supra note 57, at 93-94; Bernard T. Bormann & A. Ross Kiester,
Options Forestry: Acting on Uncertainty, 102 J. OF FORESTRY 22, 22 (June 2004) (“Unknowable
uncertainties arise when things change faster than they can be measured: Collecting more data does
not help.”).
71. Ray Hilborn and Donald Ludwig, The Limits of Applied Ecological Research, 3
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 550 (1993); Gregory et al., supra note 25; Doremus, Adaptive
Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1484-88.
72. Len Thomas, Monitoring Long-Term Population Change: Why Are There So Many
Analysis Methods?, 77 ECOLOGY 49 (1996). Figure one in the article highlights how very different
trend lines can be identified using different analytic tools with the same data.
73. Bormann & Kiester, supra note 70, at 22-23 (“the true confidence intervals surrounding
many policies overlap, to the extent that choosing one over another is based on something other than
what is known”); Emery Roe, Why Ecosystem Management Can’t Work Without Social Science: An
Example from the California Northern Spotted Owl Controversy, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 667, 670-71
(1996) (adaptive management “will leave behind as many, if not more, research and management
uncertainties as it resolves”).
74. This is true in the context of a relatively open, public, and democratic political system
like in the United States. In a more authoritarian system, the ability of stakeholders to use
uncertainty to derail adaptive management will be reduced because the role that stakeholders play in
decisionmaking will be reduced.
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Controversy over those impacts, along with legal constraints (such as the
Endangered Species Act) and Congressional action (the Grand Canyon
Preservation Act (“GCPA”)) forced the Bureau of Reclamation (which
operates the Dam) to develop an adaptive management program for the
Dam. A series of experimental floods beginning in 1996 were designed
to test whether significant changes to the operations of the Dam might
improve the conditions of a range of downstream natural resources. The
consensus in the scientific and policy literature was that the experimental
floods were a resounding success, and provided strong and actionable
monitoring data that supported significant changes in Dam operations.
Yet it is only recently, about fifteen years after the process began, that
major changes have occurred in the Dam’s operations. 75 Critics argue
that this is because of the decision-making structure for the Dam: power
and water interests who would be hurt most by Dam reoperation have an
effective veto over changes to Dam operation.76 These powerful
interests have pointed to residual uncertainty about the results of various
experimental flooding to argue that there is no basis for significant
changes in Dam operations.77 They also have drawn on burden of proof.
In an early article on adaptive management for the Dam, staff members
for the Western Area Power Administration (one of the major power
interests associated with the Dam) called for setting a high burden of
proof for any changes from the status quo for Dam operations. 78
Political pressure in this context may well be asymmetric; it might
regularly weigh more on the side of increasing exploitation of natural
resources for human use in the face of uncertain data about the status of
those resources. In the fisheries context, there is evidence that when
fisheries scientists give policymakers a range of possible figures for the
status of a fishery (highlighting the uncertainty present in the data),79

75. See Felicity Barringer, Dam’s Flow Limit Loosened to Feed Grand Canyon, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/science/earth/dam-limits-loosenedto-feed-grand-canyon.html (reporting proposal by government to allow for high-flow releases from
Glen Canyon Dam, a significant change from prior dam management).
76. Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of
Social Engineering Over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 897, 921-29 (2008); Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond
Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8
NEV. L.J. 942, 947-53 (2008); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive
Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (2010).
77. Susskind et al., supra note 76, at 46-49; Feller, supra note 76, at 921-29.
78. Mark J. Wieringa and Anthony G. Morton, Hydropower, Adaptive Management, and
Biodiversity, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 831, 832-33 (1996) (“Operational modifications should have
measurable and beneficial effects that clearly outweigh the adverse effects on other resources.”).
79. Many leading adaptive management scholars regularly call for agencies and scientists to
“embrace uncertainty” by being open about uncertainty in their communications with the public and
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policymakers consistently choose the estimates that will allow the most
fishing activity, and therefore increase the risk of collapse for a fishery.80
Indeed, fisheries scientists have argued that this is precisely what
happened in the run-up to the collapse of the Canada Atlantic cod
fishery—a fishery that once was one of the largest in the world and has
been defunct since the mid-1990s. According to these assessments, both
scientists and policymakers consistently drew the most optimistic
conclusions about the status of the cod fishery from the relevant data,
until the collapse was so obvious that there was no choice but to
completely end fishing. 81
Even where there is not disproportionate political power among the
various interest groups involved in an environmental dispute, uncertainty
may nonetheless allow various stakeholders to continue fights over
policy even after the adaptive management program has been
established. Most natural resource debates involve fundamental conflicts
over goals and objectives. 82 As such they are examples of “wicked
in the development of management and regulatory decisions. See generally Walters, supra note 42;
Williams et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 30, at 3-4;
Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 29; LEE, supra note 46, at 63; Gunderson, Adaptive Dancing, supra
note 42, at 37-38; Ray Hilborn et al., Current Trends in Including Risk and Uncertainty in Stock
Assessment and Harvest Decisions, 50 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 874 (1993) (call for
fisheries biologists to be more explicit about risk and uncertainty when presenting stock assessments
to decision-makers).
80. See Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Perry’s Question:
Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649 (2003).
81. See Jeffrey A. Hutchings & Ransom A. Myers, What Can Be Learned from the Collapse
of a Renewable Resource? Atlantic Cod, Gadus morhua, of Newfoundland and Labrador, 51
CANADIAN J. FISHERIES & AQUATIC SCI. 2126, 2144 (1994); Jeffrey A. Hutchings et al., Is
Scientific Inquiry Incompatible With Government Information Control?, 54 CANADIAN J. FISHERIES
& AQUATIC SCI. 1198, 1198-99, 1202-03 (1997); Lennox O’Reilly Hinds, Crisis in Canada’s
Atlantic Sea Fisheries, 19 MARINE POL’Y 271, 281 (1995); Quinn Schiermeier, How Many More
Fish in the Sea?, 419 NATURE 662, 662-63 (2002); Ransom A. Myers et al., Hypotheses for the
Decline of Cod in the North Atlantic, 138 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 293 (1996); The
Cod that Disappeared, NEW SCIENTIST, 16 Sept. 1995, at 24, 28; D.H. Steele et al., The Managed
Commercial Annihilation of Northern Cod, 8 NEWFOUNDLAND STUDIES 34, 48 (1992); Barbara
Neis, Fishers’ Ecological Knowledge and Stock Assessment in Newfoundland, 8 NEWFOUNDLAND
STUDIES 155, 171-72 (1992); Cabot Martin, The Collapse of the Northern Cod Stocks: Whatever
Happened to 86/25?, 20 FISHERIES No. 5, p. 6, 7 (May 1995).
82. R. Edward Grumbine, Reflections on “What is Ecosystem Management?”, 11
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 41, 47 (1997) (“All resource allocation decisions are matters of political
struggle rather than technical facts.”); Rebecca J. McLain & Robert G. Lee, Adaptive Management:
Promises and Pitfalls, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 437, 439 (1996); Conroy et al., supra note 57, at 93
(“decisions in conservation biology commonly involve conflicts over objectives”); LEE, supra note
46, at 87; R. McGreggor Cawley & John Freemuth, Tree Farms, Mother Earth, and Other
Dilemmas: The Politics of Ecosystem Management in Greater Yellowstone, 6 SOC’Y & NAT. RES.
41 (1993); W. Bruce Shepard, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: New Perspectives’ in the Forest
Service, RENEWABLE RES. J. 8 (1990).
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problems” for which “there are no true or false answers.” In these
problems “many parties are equally equipped, interested, and/or entitled
to judge the solutions, although none has the power to set formal
decision rules to determine correctness. Their judgments are likely to
differ widely to accord with their group or personal interests, their
special value-sets, and their ideological predilections.”83
In the environmental context there are a wide range of goals that
stakeholders pursue, and many of those goals are seen as permissible
politically and legally. 84 For instance, adaptive management is often
pursued as part of the broader concept of ecosystem management. But
goals in ecosystem management tend to be vague. 85 They are frequently
too broad to be of use to structure outcomes or constrain the level of
debate among stakeholders about what goals should be. 86
Yet there is a widespread agreement in the adaptive management
literature that, at least in the beginning of the adaptive management
process, there needs to be a clear articulation among
participants/managers/stakeholders as to the objectives or the goals for
the regulatory or management program in question.87 Clear goals are

83. Horst W.J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning, 4
POL’Y SCI. 155, 163 (1973); Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing
for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L. J. 407, 433-34 (2008).
84. See AARON WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY
ANALYSIS 215 (1979) (“To know whether objectives are being achieved, one must first know what
they are supposed to be. Yet, the assumption that objectives are known, clear, and consistent is at
variance with all experience. We know that objectives invariably may be distinguished by three
outstanding qualities: they are multiple, conflicting, and vague. . . . The classic case is the multipleuse concept in natural resources that posits equal value for both preservation and use.’”).
85. See, e.g., Thomas A. More, Forestry’s Fuzzy Concepts: An Examination of Ecosystem
Management, 94 J. OF FORESTRY 8, 19 (Aug. 1996); Allan K. Fitzsimmons, Sound Policy or Smoke
and Mirrors: Does Ecosystem Management Make Sense?, 32 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 217
(1996); Oliver Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV.
869, 938 (1997); Steven L. Yaffee, Three Faces of Ecosystem Management, 13 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 713 (1999).
86. Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in
Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1261 (2008); Roger A Sedjo,
Toward an Operational Approach to Public Forest Management, 94 J. OF FORESTRY 8, 24 (Aug.
1996) (noting vagueness of the concept and that it is “least intelligible when determining
objectives”).
87. Byron K. Williams, Adaptive Management of Natural Resources — Framework and
Issues, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1346, 1348 (2011); Jamie E. McFadden et al., Evalauting the Efficacy
of Adaptive Management Approaches: Is There a Formula For Success?, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT.
1354, 1356 (2011); Byron K. Williams, Passive and Active Adaptive Management: Approaches and
an Example, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1371, 1178 (2011); Clinton T. Moore et al., Adaptive
Management in the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System: Science-Management Partnerships for
Conservation Delivery, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1395 1396 (2011); Gregory et al., supra note 25, at
2418; James E. Lyons et al., Monitoring in the Context of Structured Decision-Making and Adaptive
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important for an adaptive management program for three reasons. First,
goals help determine what the important management or regulatory
questions are, and therefore what information an adaptive management
program can provide and how to design monitoring or experiments to
reduce the relevant uncertainty. 88 Second, goals help determine what
kinds of tradeoffs are present in making decisions about whether and
how to pursue adaptive management (i.e., what costs will be necessarily
entailed by an adaptive management program, and whether those costs
are worth paying). 89 Finally, goals are required so that the adaptive
management program can evaluate success or failure for various
management options. 90
Given all this, it is no surprise that a failure to resolve underlying
controversy has been identified as a reason why adaptive management
has failed. Stakeholders that are still in conflict over underlying goals
for a regulatory or management program may continually point to
residual uncertainty to support their differing positions and resist
unfavorable regulatory or management action, even in the face of
apparently successful experiments and monitoring programs. 91 The
Glen Canyon Dam adaptive management program again provides an
example of this dynamic: Congress has never provided clear guidance
among conflicting goals for management of the Dam (water storage,
power generation, recreational use, protection of downstream Grand
Canyon resources, and protection of endangered species), and due to
this, it is difficult to resolve underlying uncertainty by determining what

Management, 77 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 1683, 1684 (2008); Craig R. Allen et al., supra note 12, at
1339; N. SALUFSKY ET AL., BIODIVERSITY SUPPORT PROGRAM, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: A TOOL
FOR CONSERVATION PURPOSES 34-36 (2001); Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 47 fig. 7.
88. Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1, at 1469
(noting “the need for clear goals” for adaptive management to succeed, because “[w]ithout
identified management goals, it is impossible to understand what relevant information is missing”).
89. For instance, an adaptive harvest management for North American waterfowl was limited
in terms of management choices and experimentation because of fundamental disagreements about
what goals of management should be, and how to prioritize among those goals (harvest size,
population size, simplicity of regulatory system, among others in developing and implementing
experiments). Fred A. Johnson, Learning and Adaptation in the Management of Waterfowl
Harvests, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1385, 1391-92 (2011).
90. Gordon L. Baskerville, The Forestry Problem: Adaptive Lurches of Renewal, in
BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWABLE OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 37, 88 (Lance H.
Gunderson et al., eds. 1995).
91. McLain & Lee, supra note 82, at 261, 279; Courtland L. Smith et al. Sailing the Shoals of
Adaptive Management: The Case of Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 22 ENVTL. MGMT. 671 (1998)
(noting how significant uncertainty in scientific understanding of why salmon runs are decreasing is
drawn upon by different interest groups to advance their own positions about appropriate salmon
policy).
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risks are more important and what risks are less important to consider in
making management changes. 92 As a result, all stakeholders can point to
the uncertainty that surrounds the management or regulatory choices
they oppose, and effectively stalemate any changes in management or
regulation in an ongoing proxy fight over the goals.93
Thus, disputes over values or conflicts may not be resolved by an
adaptive management process, but instead simply exist below the
surface, manifesting themselves in ongoing contests over whether the
adaptive management program has really “proven” anything. In contrast
to disputes where there is a shared understanding of common goals,
adaptive management is constrained in its ability to solve disputes with
underlying value conflicts.94
III. CONCLUSION
My focus here has been on the question of whether adaptive
management should be the justification for major changes in the
structure and process of environmental law, and my conclusion is a
skeptical one. There may well be other reasons that we want to increase
flexibility and dynamism in environmental law, perhaps because of
changes in climate,95 but those should be based on other arguments in
addition to, or instead of, adaptive management.
Nonetheless, while adaptive management is not a panacea, I also
believe that it will play a useful, even important, role in environmental
decision-making, within significant limits. Those limits include:

92. Zellmer & Gunderson, supra note 13, at 930-31; see also HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL.,
CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 4 (arguing that lack of clear goals doomed
the adaptive management program in the Everglades).
93. Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2418 (“A skilled participant can nearly always spin
issues of uncertainty management in creative and self-serving ways.”); see also Robert H. Socolow,
Failures of Discourse: Obstacles to the Integration of Environmental Values Into Natural Resource
Policy, in WHEN VALUES CONFLICT: ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, DISCOURSE, AND
DECISION 1-2 (Laurence H. Tribe et al., eds. 1976); Andrew J. Tyre & Sarah Michaels, Confronting
Socially Generated Uncertainty in Adaptive Management, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1365, 1366-67
(2011) (describing how, when subjective expert probabilities are used to parameterize biological
models, stakeholders will contest those probabilities that conflict with their goals).
94. Fred Johnson & Ken Williams, Protocol and Practice in the Adaptive Management of
Waterfowl Harvests, 3 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y ART. 8 (1999), available at
http://www.consecol.org/vol3/iss1/art8; FLEISCHMAN, supra note 12, at 16; Koontz & Bodine,
supra note 12, at 65 (BLM employees report that unresolved conflict is a major reason why
ecosystem management fails); Stankey et al., supra note 13, at 34 (framing problems “as technical
in nature when often they involve value-based issues” has lead to problems with many adaptive
management projects).
95. Kundis Craig, supra note 10.
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•

A geographic and temporal scale that makes either multiple
management and regulatory options, or at least monitoring
of ongoing management and regulatory decisions,
feasible; 96
• Time that is sufficient for adaptive management to provide
useful information before decisions expected to have
system-transforming results need to be made;
• Institutional and legal structures that will ensure the
production of high-quality monitoring data and that are
stable enough to maintain monitoring and adaptive
management programs over extended periods of time;
• Benefits of adaptive management (in terms of improved
information and reduced uncertainty) that exceed the costs
(not just the direct costs of setting up management options
and monitoring the results, but also the indirect costs of
foregone benefits from exploitation of the resource and
increased short-term risks of harm to valuable resources);
• Flexibility that does not present unacceptable levels of
uncertainty for society or undermine management or
regulation because of political pressures; 97
• Sufficient agreement on underlying management and
regulatory goals that makes it plausible that additional
information will improve the decision-making process;
• Dynamism and uncertainty that are high enough to justify
the need for adaptive management, but not so high that they
make it difficult or impossible to reduce uncertainty
through adaptive management.
These limits apply to both active and passive adaptive management,
though they may more seriously limit active adaptive management.
It is unclear whether many of these criteria are actually satisfied in
many of the areas of environmental law where adaptive management is
currently being pursued. For instance, adaptive management might not
be appropriate for fisheries where the relevant species population
dynamics are so complex and unpredictable that additional data may not
be useful for management. 98 Adaptive management faces serious
96. See generally Gregory et al., supra note 25.
97. For an effort to develop a proposal that achieves this, see Kundis Craig, supra note 10, at
17, arguing for principled flexibility in which flexibility is allowed with respect to the means of
achieving environmental goals, but not as to which goals are pursued or whether action should be
taken to achieve those goals. See also Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change, supra note 59.
98. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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challenges when used for the protection of endangered species, both
because there may not be sufficient time to develop additional
information before major, irreversible, high-stakes decisions have to be
made, and because the risks of short-term irreversible harm for
endangered species from experimentation might outweigh the benefits of
improved information. 99 As for climate change adaptation, for changes
that are happening at a large temporal and geographic scale, pursuing
active adaptive management might be infeasible and too costly. 100
Of course, any assessment of the merits and demerits of adaptive
management as a policy tool has to be relative: how effective is adaptive
management compared to other possible options? The current primary
option is what J.B. Ruhl has called “front-end” decision-making, 101 in
which decision-makers attempt to fully predict possible outcomes based
on different alternatives, weigh the pros and cons of those different
alternatives, and implement the best alternative, without significant
follow-up monitoring or adjustment in response to that monitoring. 102
On some of the issues discussed in this paper, both adaptive
management and “front-end” analysis have their pros and cons: frontend analysis will be more useful where dynamism and complexity are
limited and adaptive management where dynamism and complexity are
more significant, but still allow for learning. But where dynamism and
complexity might be so high that learning is impossible, we might again
be better off with relatively rigid, inflexible standards based on front-end
analysis. 103
For other factors, “front-end” analysis at first blush appears
superior. Rigid, up-front standards avoid the risks and costs of
flexibility described in this paper. For still others, adaptive management
might be the best of a bad set of choices. For instance, it seems clear
that adaptive management will, in general, be better in producing
information in the face of uncertainty than “front-end” analysis, even
where scale imposes significant limits on adaptive management. 104 The
99. But see Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously, supra note 19, at 1265 (“the one
spot on the spectrum of species decline we ought to hope and expect to find adaptive management at
work is at the point when we think a species might very well become extinct. If we do not practice
adaptive management at that stage, what is the point of doing anything?”).
100. Gregory et al., supra note 25, at 2423.
101. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation, supra note 8.
102. This model describes how environmental analysis under NEPA more or less currently
proceeds. See e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (2002).
103. See, e.g., Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Predictable Behavior, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 560
(1983).
104. See supra Section II.A.1.
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flexibility of adaptive management, if implemented right, might also
make decision-making more responsive to rapid (but not-too-rapid)
changes in environmental conditions.
A full examination of the relative pros and cons of adaptive
management and the other, main alternatives is beyond the scope of this
paper. I think one of the most important lessons of this paper is that
such a relative analysis is necessary, and not just on the turf that is most
favorable to adaptive management.
There are two other major lessons that I draw from the limits of
adaptive management. First, instead of attempting to adopt wholesale
the concept of adaptive management into environmental law and
concomitantly force major changes on environmental law to make the fit
work, 105 we might instead look to see how the concept of adaptive
management might be “adapted” so it works better with environmental
law. While scholars have criticized agencies for pursuing passive
adaptive management or trial and error, rather than active adaptive
management, and have argued for legal and structural changes in
response, my assessment indicates that perhaps we should be more
sympathetic to the agencies and the law. There might be good reasons
that large-scale experiments are not feasible for many of the regulatory
and management problems we face. It is for these reasons Holly
Doremus has suggested the phrase “learning while doing” instead of
adaptive management because the former phrase broadens the focus
beyond large-scale experiments. 106 I think this is an important first step
in making the discussions over the interaction between adaptive
management and environmental law into a two-way conversation
between legal scholars and environmental managers and scientists about
how both adaptive management and environmental law might need to be
adjusted to work better together.
Second, we might question whether the adaptation that adaptive
management requires in environmental law means that the legal system
must necessarily become more flexible. Indeed, it may be that
stringently applied standards in environmental law could help us better
achieve the underlying goals of learning while doing or adaptive
management. Tough standards can both inspire the efforts needed to
establish adaptive management programs that might increase
information—for example, ESA restrictions threaten significant

105.
106.
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economic impacts unless a better management solution is found 107— and
also provide outer limits on the experiments and changes that are part of
adaptive management, providing important protection to valuable
resources. 108
An example of how standards might be usefully applied to adaptive
management is the concept of triggers: ex ante standards that, if met,
automatically cause significant management or regulatory responses.109
Triggers can be used to force adaptation in response to monitoring
results; they can also be used to provide underlying guarantees that
important resources will be protected from serious, irreversible impacts
from adaptive management experiments.110
Triggers have limits: triggers cannot produce agreements where
none are to be found. 111 Sophisticated stakeholders who understand
uncertainty and the relevant resources that are relevant for the dispute
107. See, e.g., FLEISCHMAN, supra note 12, at 16; Joy B. Zedler, Adaptive Management of
Coastal Ecosystems to Support Endangered Species, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 735 (1997); Yaffee, supra
note 13, at 726 (arguing that ESA is “needed to encourage development interests and agencies to
engage in the multiparty discussions critical to achieving effective eco- system management”);
Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 57, at 1263-64 (arguing ESA helped force environmental
protection and change the political burden of proof for ecological restoration).
108. See, e.g., Rohlf, Integrating Science, Law, and Policy in Managing Natural Resources,
supra note 59; Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously, supra note 19, at 1249 (noting need
for “inflexible commands” as part of overall process); Carl Walters, Designing Fisheries
Management Systems That Do Not Depend Upon Accurate Stock Assessment, 280, in REINVENTING
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Tony J. Pitcher et al., eds. 1998) (in light of fundamental uncertainty in
fisheries, calling for using a coarse, fixed standard in which we “treat the seas as closed to fishing
with small exceptions”); Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, supra note 1,
at 1485; Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management, supra note 8, at 54-56 (arguing that
implementation of adaptive management requires restrictions on volatility and drift in agency
decision-making).
109. Moir & Block, supra note 30, at 146; HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, supra note 46, at 11 (“In order to ensure that adaptation occurs,
management plans should set forth clear benchmarks for adapting to new information or changing
circumstances.”); SALUFSKY ET AL., supra note 87, at 59-60; Doremus, Adaptive Management, the
Endangered Species Act, supra note 11, at 85-86; Julien Martin, et al., Structured Decision Making
As A Conceptual Framework To Identify Thresholds For Conservation And Management, 19
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1079, 1080-81 (2009). For a thorough overview of triggers and how
they have been used, see Martin Nie & Courtney Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive
Management, REPORT TO USDA PACIFIC NORTHWEST RESEARCH STATION, NEPA FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Nov. 1, 2011).
110. Another advantage is that by requiring stakeholders or agency staff to articulate what
levels of uncertainty are acceptable for a monitoring program, triggers can produce a constructive
dialogue about uncertainty and the role it might play in decision-making—much the way that initial
modeling in adaptive management programs can produce a constructive dialogue about underlying
assumptions and goals in environmental disputes.
111. See Nie & Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive Management, supra note 109
(noting how triggers have not resolved disputes over the management of the Tongass National
Forest).
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will know how to manipulate the setting of triggers and won’t agree to
triggers that might undermine their goals.112 If ex ante uncertainty is
high enough to preclude this kind of strategy, sophisticated stakeholders
may simply refuse to agree to triggers. Moreover, it is impossible to
predict and plan for all contingencies in environmental regulation and
management. Thus, there is an inevitable possibility that surprises will
be turned up in the adaptive management program that haven’t been
planned for in the trigger system. 113 Finally, there is a risk that the
trigger system might have an “expiration date.” If the monitoring
program and trigger system require a long enough time to operate, the
political, economic, and social landscape may have changed
significantly in the interim, such that any trigger might not be
enforceable. 114
There are other possibilities. For instance, statutes that authorize or
even require agencies to use adaptive management do not necessarily
need to give the agencies more flexibility. Simply granting the authority
or even mandating adaptive management might be done without making
other changes to the various procedural or substantive structures in
environmental law.115
Even changes to existing procedural or substantive requirements to
help advance adaptive management need not result in overall reductions
in flexibility. Indeed, if properly structured, such changes might reduce
the risk that agencies attempt to use adaptive management to augment
their discretion at the expense of other important goals. Statutory
reforms might require that an agency make certain findings before
pursuing adaptive management (e.g., that adaptive management will in
fact be useful for the problems the agency is attempting to address), and

112. WILDAVSKY, supra note 84, at 216 (“Strategically located participants often refuse to
accept definitions of objectives that would put them at a disadvantage or in a straightjacket should
they wish to change their designation of what they do in the future.”). There are a range of ways in
which triggers can be adjusted or manipulated: the baseline from which the triggers is measured, the
actual level for the trigger, or the level of uncertainty required to be satisfied for determining
whether that level has been met; and the mandatory nature of the specific management or regulatory
responses that will be imposed if the trigger is met. All of these points are often the focus of
significant dispute among stakeholders. See Nie & Schultz, Decision Making Triggers in Adaptive
Management, supra note 109.
113. Such situations may nonetheless be useful, as they produce very important information
about the world, helpfully revising our scientific understandings. LEE, supra note 46, at 148-49.
114. See SALUFSKY ET AL., supra note 87, at 60 (unclear “whether people would make
decisions based on a discussion that had been held years ago”).
115. Of course, if adaptive management really does require substantial changes in procedural
or substantive requirements in environmental law, authorizing or requiring its use by agencies
without making those changes simply sets those agencies up for failure.
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it might impose significant requirements on an agency that seeks to
pursue adaptive management (e.g., mandatory, enforceable monitoring
or reporting requirements), in return for some revisions to existing
procedural or substantive requirements. The goal here would be to make
adaptive management useful for an agency when adaptive management
is, in fact, a useful tool for reducing uncertainty, rather than a
standardless loophole from otherwise applicable legal requirements.
The result of such a balance might be fewer claims by agencies that they
are using adaptive management (because such claims now come with
real, but useful, costs), but more real use of adaptive management. What
adaptive management might need, ultimately, is not more flexibility than
traditional environmental law, but different kinds of constraints.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/5

30

